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“Right Divided, a Disciplined Left Steered the Supreme Court” 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
June 30, 2015 
 
The stunning series of liberal decisions 
delivered by the Supreme Court this term was 
the product of discipline on the left side of the 
court and disarray on the right. 
 
In case after case, including blockbusters on 
same-sex marriage and President Obama’s 
health care law, the court’s four-member 
liberal wing, all appointed by Democratic 
presidents, managed to pick off one or more 
votes from the court’s five conservative 
justices, all appointed by Republicans. 
 
They did this in large part through rigorous 
bloc voting, making the term that concluded 
Monday the most liberal one since the 
Warren court in the late 1960s, according to 
two political-science measurements of court 
voting data. 
 
“The most interesting thing about this term is 
the acceleration of a long-term trend of 
disagreement among the Republican-
appointed judges, while the Democratic-
appointed judges continue to march in lock 
step,” said Eric Posner, a law professor at the 
University of Chicago. 
 
Many analysts credit the leadership of Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the senior member of 
the liberal justices, for leveraging their four 
votes. “We have made a concerted effort to 
speak with one voice in important cases,” she 
said in an interview last year. 
The court’s conservatives, by contrast, were 
often splintered, issuing separate opinions 
even when they agreed on the outcome. The 
conservative justices, for instance, produced 
more than 40 dissenting opinions, the liberals 
just 13. 
 
The divisions on the right, Professor Posner 
said, may have occurred in part because the 
mix of cases reaching the court has invited a 
backlash. “Conservative litigators who hope 
to move the law to the right by bringing cases 
to the Supreme Court have overreached,” he 
said. “They are trying to move the law farther 
right than Kennedy or Roberts think 
reasonable.” 
 
For example, in King v. Burwell, the case 
brought by groups hostile to the Affordable 
Care Act, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. 
and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined the 
court’s four liberals in rejecting the challenge 
to health insurance subsidies provided 
through federal exchanges. Justices Antonin 
Scalia, Clarence Thomas and Samuel A. 
Alito Jr. dissented. 
 
In addition, Professor Posner said, the 
conservative justices are airing real 
jurisprudential disagreements. “Kennedy, 
Roberts and Alito’s pragmatism contrasts 
with the formalism of Scalia and Thomas, for 
example,” he said. 
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Lee Epstein, a law professor and political 
scientist at Washington University in St. 
Louis, said: “The Republicans can’t seem to 
agree even when they agree.” She added that 
“the chief justice has a much tougher task” 
than Justice Ginsburg does. 
 
David A. Strauss, a law professor at the 
University of Chicago, said the cases the 
court agreed to hear this past term might have 
created a misperception about how liberal it 
has become. “It’s still a conservative court — 
just not as conservative as some had hoped 
and some had feared,” he said. “King might 
never even have been brought if the court, or 
at least some justices, had not given signals 
that they were receptive to claims like that.” 
 
The term was not uniformly liberal, of 
course. On Monday alone, the court ruled 
against death row inmates in a case on lethal 
injections and against the Obama 
administration in a case on environmental 
regulations. 
 
Nor is the court remotely as liberal as the 
Warren court, which issued a far greater 
percentage of liberal decisions, often 
unanimously, in cases on school 
desegregation, interracial marriage, voting 
rights and criminal procedure. 
 
The Obama administration, though, found an 
unlikely ally in the court in major cases, said 
Pratik A. Shah, a lawyer with Akin Gump 
Strauss Hauer & Feld. “Not many imagined a 
few years ago,” Mr. Shah said, “that this 
court, rather than Congress, would become 
the more effective venue for furthering the 
administration’s priorities.” 
 
When the administration ended up on the 
losing side, it was often because it took a 
conservative position, particularly in criminal 
cases, said Adam Winkler, a law professor at 
the University of California, Los Angeles. 
 
“The administration most often lost the court 
because it couldn’t hold the liberals,” 
Professor Winkler said. “The 
administration’s positions in the Supreme 
Court were too conservative. Shockingly, the 
Supreme Court may have been more liberal 
than the Obama administration this term.” 
This was so, he said, in cases involving drugs, 
guns, searches and threats posted on 
Facebook. 
 
When the four liberal members of the court 
— Justices Ginsburg, Stephen G. Breyer, 
Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan — 
achieved a majority, they were often happy to 
let others do the talking. 
“I was struck by the discipline of the liberal 
wing — both in sticking together and in 
suppressing the urge any of them may have 
felt to write separately,” said Michael Dorf, a 
law professor at Cornell. This produced 
strong and united opinions, he said, from 
Justice Kennedy in Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
same-sex marriage case, and from Chief 
Justice Roberts in the health care case. 
 
Dissenting in Obergefell, Justice Scalia 
accused the court’s liberals of a sort of 
intellectual dishonesty in joining Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion, which he charged 
sacrificed legal rigor for soaring language. 
“If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth 
vote, I ever joined an opinion for the court” 
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that included such vague passages, he wrote, 
quoting one, “I would hide my head in a bag.” 
 
Justice Kennedy, the member of the court at 
its ideological center, did his part in moving 
the court to the left. As usual, he was in the 
majority in most of the 19 decisions decided 
by 5-to-4 votes. 
 
Thirteen of those rulings split along the usual 
lines, with Justice Kennedy joining either the 
court’s four more liberal members or its four 
more conservative ones. In previous terms, 
he leaned right in such cases about two-thirds 
of the time. This time around, he voted with 
the liberals eight times and with the 
conservatives five. 
 
In major cases, the court seemed to capture 
the spirit of the time, notably in establishing 
a constitutional right to same-sex marriage as 
a majority of Americans came to embrace it. 
Justice Ginsburg seemed to anticipate and 
explain the ruling in recent remarks at the 
American Constitution Society, a liberal 
legal group. “The court is not in a popularity 
contest, and it should never be influenced by 
today’s headlines, by the weather of today,” 
she said. “Inevitably, it will be affected by the 
climate of the era.” 
 
Samuel Issacharoff, a law professor at New 
York University, said the court had played a 
traditional and proper role in the case. “The 
speed of the shifting societal consensus on 
same-sex marriage is astonishing,” he said. 
“The court protecting the emerging national 
consensus is not.” 
 
A second 5-to-4 decision, allowing Texas to 
reject specialty license plates bearing the 
Confederate battle flag, was issued the 
morning after the shootings in Charleston, 
S.C., started a national debate about the 
meaning of that symbol. The timing was 
coincidence, and the vote was close. The 
liberals, as usual, voted as a group — but they 
were joined by Justice Thomas in a rare 
alliance. 
 
This term may have been an anomaly, and the 
next one may shift back to the right. The 
justices have already agreed to hear cases on 
affirmative action and the meaning of “one 
person, one vote,” and they are likely to hear 
a major abortion case. Last term, the court 
issued unanimous decisions in about two-
thirds of its case, a modern record. This term, 
the number dropped to about 40 percent, a 
little lower than the average in recent terms. 
 
But the court remained united in cases 
involving religion, issuing unanimous rulings 
in favor of a Muslim inmate in an Arkansas 
prison who wanted to grow a beard and an 
Arizona church that challenged a town 
ordinance limiting the size of signs 
announcing services. 
 
Business groups had a mixed record, winning 
12 of the 22 cases in which they faced 
individuals or the government. “This term’s 
business decisions should put an end to the 
persistent theory that the Roberts court is 
reflexively biased in favor of corporate 
interests,” said Lauren R. Goldman, a lawyer 
with Mayer Brown. 
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Moreover, she said, many of the business 
victories were narrow. “On the other side of 
the ledger,” she said, “the court handed the 
business community several substantial 
losses.” Among the setbacks, she said, were 
victories for plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases and a broad 
interpretation of the scope of the Fair 
Housing Act 
Over all, though, the story of the last nine 
months at the Supreme Court was of leftward 
movement. 
 
“This term feels just huge,” said Lisa S. Blatt, 
a lawyer with Arnold & Porter who has 
argued more than 30 cases in the Supreme 
Court and studied its work for two decades. 
“It’s clearly the most liberal term I’ve seen 
since I’ve been watching the court.” 
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“Supreme Court’s Liberal Admirers Get Reality Check” 
Politico 
Josh Gerstein 
June 29, 2015 
 
Liberals still giddy over a series of major 
victories at the Supreme Court last week got 
a bracing reality check Monday, as 
conservatives carried the day on key cases 
involving the death penalty and President 
Barack Obama’s environmental agenda. 
 
Progressives got another signal that any 
momentum they were experiencing at the 
high court could be short-lived: the justices 
announced they will address the thorny issue 
of affirmative action next term, taking up for 
the second time a case challenging the 
University of Texas’s use of race in its 
admissions process. 
 
For some, it felt like whiplash. 
 
“The cases today are shocking,” said Nan 
Aron, a prominent liberal activist and 
president of Alliance for Justice. “Last week 
was wonderful and no one can take away the 
victories that occurred, but I think it’s also 
important to understand those victories in a 
context [that] the court is one that continues 
to rule in favor of powerful and wealthy 
interests at the expense of most Americans. 
The decisions certainly today suggest that 
trend continues.” 
 
Aron dismissed conclusions that the court 
was shifting to the left as it ruled in favor of 
same-sex marriage rights and upheld the 
nationwide availability of insurance 
subsidies under Obamacare, calling such 
pronouncements “largely premature and 
exaggerated.” 
 
Some conservatives agreed that the court 
wasn’t necessarily taking a new direction. 
 
“I always thought the claims that the Roberts 
court ‘is the most conservative since’ 
whenever were overblown and I think the 
claims of a dramatic leftward turn are 
overblown, too,” said Jonathan Adler, a law 
professor at Case Western Reserve. “When 
you kind of step back and look at the 
substance of the cases, what’s at issue and 
what the court did, I don’t think you see a 
great liberal shift.” 
 
All three decisions the justices issued 
Monday were 5-4 rulings. Justice Anthony 
Kennedy voted with the court’s other 
Republican appointees to reject a challenge 
to Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol, 
effectively easing application of the death 
penalty nationwide, and to knock back 
regulations the Obama administration issued 
trying to limit mercury in power plants, 
complicating Obama’s environmental 
policies. 
 
Even the sole case where the court’s liberal 
wing prevailed Monday by winning over 
Kennedy had a potential downside for the 
left. The court’s ruling allowing the 
redistricting of congressional seats to be 
handled by independent commissions is 
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likely a setback to Republicans in Arizona, 
which brought the case to the justices, but a 
blow to Democrats in the much-larger state 
of California. 
 
While Monday’s decisions provided an 
important reminder that conservatism is still 
alive and well in the Supreme Court’s 
chambers, some analysts insisted that the 
court’s tilt to the left in the current term was 
unmistakable. 
 
“The numbers show that this is easily the 
most liberal term of the Roberts Court, and 
probably the last couple of decades,” 
SCOTUSblog founder and Supreme Court 
lawyer Tom Goldstein told POLITICO. “For 
all the talk of a conservative bloc, it was the 
more liberal Justices who hung together went 
it counted.” 
 
Goldstein analyzed 26 cases this term in 
which the vote was close (either 6-3 or 5-4) 
and seemed to split along ideological lines. 
He found the left prevailed in 19 cases, while 
the conservatives were victorious in only 
seven. 
 
One factor preventing some liberals from 
rejoicing about the Supreme Court results 
this term is a fear of what’s to come. The 
return of affirmative action to the court’s 
docket for the next term made some on the 
left jittery. 
 
“It does seem ominous,” said Caroline 
Fredrickson of the American Constitution 
Society. “I’m worried….that the justices 
would like to put the nail in the coffin for 
affirmative action.” 
The court muddied the waters further 
Monday afternoon with orders in heated 
disputes over abortion restrictions, as well as 
contraception-coverage requirements under 
Obamacare. 
 
The justices, by a 5-4 vote, blocked 
enforcement of a new Texas state law forcing 
abortion clinics to upgrade their facilities and 
use doctors with admitting privileges at 
nearby hospitals. Abortion rights advocates 
said about half the clinics in Texas would 
have to close under the new rules. Kennedy 
joined with the court’s liberals to prevent the 
law from taking effect until the Supreme 
Court has a chance to consider taking the 
case. 
 
The court also issued an order giving the 
Catholic archdiocese in Pittsburgh and 
several other groups the ability to escape 
Obamacare’s contraceptive coverage 
requirements until the court addresses 
whether exemptions the Obama 
administration has created for religious 
organizations are adequate. Only Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor noted a dissent from the 
order. 
 
Those moves suggest the court is likely to 
weigh in on the polarizing issues of abortion 
and Obamacare next term, in addition to the 
affirmative action case. The justices also 
announced in May that they will hear another 
politically sensitive case: a dispute from 
Texas over whether election districts must be 
drawn to cover equal numbers of voters or 
can use a count which includes residents who 




Also looming as a possible candidate for the 
docket next term: a high-stakes legal fight 
over whether President Barack Obama’s 
executive orders on immigration exceeded 
his authority. 
 
While it’s tempting to view the court as tilting 
to one side or another, many analysts and 
advocates say it isn’t really the court moving, 
but the most frequent swing justice — 
Anthony Kennedy — coming down on 
different sides in different cases. That makes 
him a more pivotal figure than even Chief 
Justice John Roberts, whose vote is more 
reliably conservative. 
 
Just as Kennedy held sway in the three cases 
resolved Monday, he could well be the 
critical vote in the affirmative action, 
abortion, voting rights and immigration 
disputes likely to be resolved in the coming 
term. 
 
“It’s not the Roberts Court, yet. It’s the 
Kennedy Court in many ways,” said 
Fredrickson. “He really controls the decision. 
The one man, the one vote kind of determines 








June 29, 2015 
 
There is a lot of commentary about the 
unusually liberal results of this Term.  I 
thought I would mention a few data points 
which back up that view of things. 
 
For present purposes, I treat four Justices as 
sitting to the Court’s left: Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, 
and Elena Kagan.  I treat four Justices as 
sitting to the Court’s right:  Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, 
Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito.  I treat 
Justice Anthony Kennedy as the Court’s 
“center.” 
 
I count 26 cases this Term that were both 
close (5-4 or 6-3) and ideological (in the 
sense that they broke down principally on 
ideological lines, with ideology seemingly an 
important factor). 
 
Of the 26 cases, the left prevailed in 19.  
Those included the first 9 of the Term.  The 
right prevailed in 7. 
 
In the 26, a Justice on the left voted with the 
right a total of 3 times.  In 2 cases, those votes 
determined the outcome and produced a more 
conservative result, because Justice Kennedy 
or one of the conservatives voted for the more 
liberal result. 
 
In the 26, a Justice on the right voted with the 
left 14 times.  In 6 cases, those votes 
determined the outcome and produced a more 
liberal result, because Justice Kennedy voted 
for the more conservative result. 
 
I also considered the 10 cases I consider most 
significant.  Of those, the left prevailed in 8.  
Those included the first 7 of the Term.  (I 
mention the early cases to give a sense of how 
the results must have appeared inside the 
Court as the Term went along.)  The right 
prevailed in 2, both in the final sitting of the 
Term. 
 
In the 10, no Justice on the left voted with the 
right; the four Justices on the left voted 
together in every one of those cases.  A 
Justice on the right voted with the left 4 times.  
Those votes determined the outcome in 2 
cases, because Justice Kennedy voted for the 
more conservative result. 
 
Note that the analysis above is skewed 
against finding the Term particularly liberal 
by treating Justice Kennedy as the Court’s 
“center.”  That is true ideologically, but he is 
certainly a conservative.  If he were 
characterized that way for my analysis, the 
number of defections to the left would be 
much higher. 
 
By that measure, a Justice on the right voted 
with the left 25 times (compared with 3 times 
the reverse happened).  That occurred in all 
10 of the 10 major cases (because no Justice 
 27 
on the left voted with the right in any of those 





“Has the Supreme Court Really Moved Leftward this Term?” 
The Washington Post 
Jonathan H. Adler 
June 25, 2015 
 
Earlier this week the New York Times 
proclaimed that the Supreme Court has 
“move(d) leftward.” Much like earlier 
pronouncements that the Roberts Court was 
the most conservative in decades – 
particularly those based upon similar types of 
analyses, the article’s central claim needs to 
be taken with healthy dose of salt. 
 
The central claim of the article is that the 
Supreme Court has had one of its most 
“liberal” terms since the end of the Warren 
Court. This conclusion is based upon an 
analysis which finds that the Court has 
adopted a “liberal” outcome in 54 percent of 
cases that have been decided thus far this 
term. Such an analysis, combined with 
consideration of the frequency each justice 
finds him or herself in the majority, may tell 
us which “side” of the court is prevailing 
more often this term, but I do not think it tells 
us all that much about the trajectory or 
tendency of the Court or its jurisprudence. 
 
One immediate problem with this sort of 
analysis is that it does not account for the 
substance of individual cases and, more 
importantly, the effect on underlying 
doctrine. That is, this sort of analysis makes 
no distinction between a case that shifts the 
law in a more conservative or liberal 
direction and a decision that maintains the 
status quo. Assuming that, at least in some 
areas, the current justices are relatively 
satisfied with current doctrine, whether a case 
is coded as “liberal” or “conservative” will be 
solely a function of the judgment under 
review. 
 
Another problem with this sort of analysis, 
particularly when used to analyze the Court’s 
behavior over time, is that it does not account 
for shifts in the law. As a consequence, this 
sort of analysis can produce conclusions that 
are precisely the opposite of what is actually 
occurring. That is, if a Court adopts a liberal 
holding at one point in time, and then refuses 
to extend that holding still further in the 
latter, the decision maintaining the 
comparatively liberal rule will be coded as a 
“conservative” holding, even though all it did 
is maintain the status quo. 
 
To illustrate this problem, consider the 
Court’s global warming decisions. In 
Massachusetts v. EPA, in 2005, the Court 
held that the greenhouse gases were 
“pollutants” subject to regulation under the 
Clean Air Act. This holding dramatically 
expanded the EPA’s regulatory authority. 
The decision also lowered the bar for 
standing in environmental cases for state 
litigants, if not more generally. This was 
clearly a “liberal” ruling. Several years later, 
in American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 
the Court held that nuisance suits against 
greenhouse gas emitters under federal 
common law were displaced by federal 
regulatory authority. This holding was a 
direct consequence of the Massachusetts v. 
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EPA holding, and would have been classified 
as a “conservative” ruling. 
 
Taken together, Mass. and AEP would 
represent a wash – a liberal decision and a 
conservative decision. Yet, as a substantive 
matter, the combination is a dramatic shift in 
the law in a “liberal” direction. Analyzing 
individual votes only magnifies the problem, 
as there were 12 votes for the “conservative” 
position in the cases combined, while only 
five votes for the “liberal” position. The sort 
of analysis embodied in the Times article 
would suggest that the Mass. Court was more 
liberal than the AEP Court, while a 
consideration of the actual decisions would 
find no change at all. AEP did nothing at all 
to scale back the holding of Massachusetts v. 
EPA, so the consequence of this “more 
conservative” Court was nothing but a 
maintenance of the status quo. 
 
Another concern I have with the article is its 
uncritical acceptance of the case coding in the 
Supreme Court Database. While conceding 
that it is “possible to quarrel with the coding 
of any individual case,” the article’s authors 
claim that “there is relatively little 
disagreement about the judgments among 
legal scholars, and the coding conventions 
are both consistently applied and in line with 
most people’s intuitions.” This may be the 
view of most political scientists, but it is 
hardly a consensus view. Indeed, multiple 
analyses of the Supreme Court Database’s 
case coding have found widespread instances 
of questionable coding, affecting as much as 
20 to 30 percent of cases.  See, for instance, 
the work of Carolyn Shapiro here and here.  
Indeed, the problems are bad enough that 
some scholars who heavily relied upon the 
database in the past have recoded cases for 
more recent analyses (such as this one, which 
was also the subject of a Times story and 
discussed here). 
 
While the coding of most contemporary cases 
is unlikely to be controversial (save for those 
where the Court splits along untraditional 
lines), the lack of consistent or reliable 
coding in the database limits the usefulness 
of historical analyses. This is particularly so 
given evidence that some coding may have 
been the result of confirmation bias, such that 
coding of some cases may have reflected 
coder expectations about the Court’s 
behavior in a given term as much as the actual 
merits of the case. 
 
Another concern I have, acknowledged in the 
piece, is the focus on a single term. Given the 
relatively small number of cases the Court 
hears each term, no single term is particularly 
representative of the Court’s work as a 
whole. Thus it is inevitable that some terms 
appear more “liberal” or “conservative” than 
others because few, if any, terms contain a 
fully representative sample of the sorts of 
issues the Court is called upon to address. 
This term, for example, despite the heavy 
roster of high profile cases, still did not 
include cases in many areas that regularly 
divide the justices along ideological lines, 
such as abortion. 
 
If we really want to know whether the Court 
is more liberal or conservative than it has 
been in the past – whether in terms of its 
trajectory or its performance in a given term 
– we need to do more than code each case as 
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“liberal” or “conservative” and tabulate the 
results. Instead we must look at the substance 
of the Court’s decisions to see whether it is 
moving the law in one direction or another – 
whether expanding gay rights and limiting 
the death penalty or constraining federal 
power and reducing protections for criminal 
defendants. 
 
In the past I’ve argued that a substantive 
analysis of the Roberts Court suggests that it 
is a generally a “conservative minimalist” 
court. That is, the modal behavior of this 
Court is to move the law slowly, but 
perceptibly, in a rightward direction, while 
maintaining a fairly heavy status-quo bias. 
There are exceptions, however, as there are 
areas in which the Court’s shift have not been 
minor (the protection of campaign-related 
speech) and still others where the Court has 
moved the law in a more liberal direction 
(gay rights and habeas rights for detainees). 
Further, in some areas in which the Court has 
shifted Right, such as abortion, it appears to 
have brought us back to where the Court had 
been in the early years of the Rehnquist 
Court. The Court may be more conservative 
than the Warren and Burger Courts, but it is 
doing very little to undo most Warren and 
Burger Court precedents. 
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“A Fractious Majority” 
Slate 
Eric Posner 
June 30, 2015 
 
In 2010, the New York Times’ Supreme Court 
reporter, Adam Liptak, wrote an article 
entitled “Court Under Roberts Is Most 
Conservative in Decades.” He noted that in 
its first five years, Chief Justice John 
Roberts’ court had rendered conservative 
decisions 58 percent of the time, and in the 
2008 term 65 percent, the highest rate in a 
half-century. The court was “the most 
conservative one in living memory.” 
Republicans, who have been trying to move 
the court to the right since Nixon was 
president, finally had put into place a rock-
solid conservative majority. 
On Monday, Liptak and some co-authors 
published another article, this one entitled 
“The Roberts Court’s Surprising Move 
Leftward.” It turns out that the most recent 
term will be the most liberal since 1969, with 
liberal decisions accounting for 56 percent of 
the cases, according to the article. Liberal 
decisions outnumber conservative decisions 
over each of the past three years, the first time 
that has happened since the 1960s. What 
happened? 
Liberals credit—and conservatives blame—
Republican-appointed Justice Anthony 
Kennedy for frequently crossing the line and 
voting for liberal outcomes. It was Kennedy 
who wrote Obergefell v. Hodges, the opinion 
recognizing a right to same-sex marriage. 
However, Kennedy has been Kennedy since 
he was appointed in 1988. He has written 
opinions friendly to gay rights since 2003. 
Kennedy himself can’t explain a trend. 
What does seem to be new, however, is that 
the Republican appointees on the court have 
found it increasingly difficult to form a united 
front against the Democratic appointees. The 
chart below shows that in the term that just 





The chart shows the percentage of cases in 
which conservative justices agree with other 
conservatives, and liberal justices agree with 
other liberals. The liberals vote with one 
another more than 90 percent of the time 
while the conservatives vote with one another 
about 70–80 percent of the time. While I lack 
Frank Luntz’s talent for political wordplay, I 
humbly submit to right-wing operatives that 
they should call the Democratic appointees 
“lockstep liberals” because of their bloc 
voting. 
You can also see this pattern in the justices’ 
decision writing. Most of the justices wrote 
six or seven majority opinions over the term. 
But there is wide variation in their propensity 
to write separate concurrences or dissents. 
Justice Elena Kagan wrote three separate 
opinions; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote 
six; Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Stephen 
Breyer wrote eight each. Roberts and 
Kennedy also wrote very few. By contrast, 
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote 26, Justice 
Clarence Thomas wrote 25, and Justice 
Samuel Alito wrote 20. 
Minorities can exercise surprising power 
when they exercise discipline in voting. A 
fractious majority—here the five Republican 
appointees—will find themselves on the 
losing side again and again if one of their own 
temporarily defects to the other side because 
of a strongly felt position on an obscure point 
of law. 
Why can’t the Republican majority exercise 
more discipline? One possible explanation is 
ideological disagreement. Mirroring the 
Republican Party, the Republican justices 
divide between social conservatives (Scalia, 
Thomas, probably Alito, and possibly 
Roberts) and a libertarian, Kennedy, who 
often casts his vote with the liberal bloc. 
Of all the justices, Kennedy is the most 
frequently ridiculed. 
As the court moved right during the first half 
of Roberts’ tenure, conservative litigants may 
have spotted the opportunity to obtain 
favorable decisions. To do so, they needed to 
challenge laws and precedents that in the past 
would have been secure. It is possible they 
overreached by bringing challenges that were 
more extreme than all five of the conservative 
justices could stomach, exposing the latent 
ideological fissures that existed between 
them.  
Another explanation is jurisprudential 
disagreement. Here the division is between 
formalists (Scalia and Thomas) and 
pragmatists (Roberts, Alito, and Kennedy). 
The formalists interpret the Constitution 
based on its original meaning and read 
statutes narrowly rather than expansively (or 
claim to). Originalism usually generates 
conservative outcomes because the 
Constitution reflects mostly 18th- and 19th-
century values. Narrow interpretation of 
legislation—as illustrated by Scalia’s dissent 
in King v. Burwell, which would have 
invalidated a key element of Obamacare 
based on a narrow interpretation of some of 
its language—tends to favor conservative 
outcomes because legislation usually 
expands government control. But not always, 
with the result that Scalia and Thomas 
sometimes come down in a liberal direction. 
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The pragmatists, by contrast, put more 
weight on precedent and usually 
unarticulated extra-legal factors. It is widely 
thought that Roberts, for example, has voted, 
twice now, to uphold Obamacare against 
challenges from the right because he believes 
that the obliteration of a major piece of 
legislation by an ideologically predictable 5–
4 vote would deal a blow to the court’s 
credibility. Nearly everyone thinks that 
Kennedy has followed public opinion on gay 
marriage. Whatever his personal views, he 
would not have found a right to same-sex 
marriage in 1988, when it was anathema to 
both parties and a majority of Americans. His 
talentless writing style, replete with cheesy 
Hallmark-card sentimentality, sets the teeth 
of the other conservatives on edge, but it 
reflects a distinctive jurisprudential 
sensibility that he has stubbornly held to, 
though no one can figure out what it is. 
The conservative justices also disagree with 
one another in more subtle ways. In King v. 
Burwell, Roberts and Kennedy rejected the 
narrow interpretation of the statute advanced 
by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. In Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry, a case decided earlier this month, 
Thomas split with the other conservatives on 
the breadth of the president’s power to 
control information put in passports. In 
Johnson v. United States, a case decided on 
Friday, Alito dissented alone as the other 
justices struck down a federal statute that 
enhanced sentences of people who had earlier 
been convicted of “violent felonies.” The 
other justices thought the term was 
unconstitutionally vague; Alito thought its 
definition could be narrowed. In all these 
cases, the liberals voted with the majority and 
kept mum. 
While partisan heterodoxy among the 
Republicans has grown in recent years, it is 
not new. Republican appointees John Paul 
Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, and David 
Souter all crossed party lines to vote with 
Democratic appointees on some of the most 
important issues of the day (abortion, 
campaign finance, rights of criminal 
defendants). By contrast, it’s hard to think of 
significant examples of liberal justices doing 
the same. Their loyalty to the party line is 
virtually unbroken. 
I wish I could explain this asymmetry, but I 
can’t. A common explanation offered by 
disgruntled conservatives—that spineless 
justices newly arrived from the provinces 
want to bask in the approval of the liberal 
media in D.C.—strikes me as pretty 
implausible. Liberals will never trust 
Kennedy—remember that he voted to strike 
down Obamacare three years ago. In a 
polarized environment, no one respects 
moderates, even if they can sometimes be 
made use of. Of all the justices, Kennedy is 
the most frequently ridiculed. No one seems 
to admire him for his independence of mind. 
Conservatives might be tempted to think that 
the Republican-appointed justices disagree 
so often, and write so frequently, because 
they take the law seriously while the liberals 
care only about pleasing the party base. If this 
is true, however, conservatives might wonder 
whether they are being well served by their 
justices. Our society has assigned legislative 
power to the Supreme Court, authorizing it to 
settle the hardest political questions by fiat. 
Gay marriage and Obamacare are now 
unshakable political facts in America, and 
will remain so long after the jurisprudential 
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“Why is John Roberts Siding with the Supreme Court’s Liberals?” 
Slate 
Adam Winkler 
June 11, 2015 
 
John Roberts has changed. Consider the chief 
justice’s voting record. From 2005—the year 
he was appointed—until 2012—the year of 
the first Affordable Care Act decision—
Roberts was a reliable vote on the court’s 
staunch conservative wing. In controversies 
from abortion to campaign finance to guns, 
Roberts sided with Justices Antonin Scalia, 
Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and 
Anthony Kennedy. The 2012 health care case 
was only the second time Roberts had ever 
voted with the liberal side of the court in a 5–
4 decision.* Lately, however, we’re seeing a 
very different Roberts. Last term Roberts 
surprised many by breaking left on a few 
major cases. And so far this term, Roberts has 
voted with Stephen Breyer (90 percent), Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg (85 percent), and Sonia 
Sotomayor (83 percent) more often than he 
has joined Thomas (66 percent), Kennedy (74 
percent), and Alito (77 percent). And that 
isn’t just on minor cases. He’s recently sided 
with the liberals in cases on issues that 
typically divide the court along ideological 
lines, including campaign finance and anti-
discrimination law. 
 
Little wonder then that some conservatives 
ask if Roberts is “going wobbly.” While court 
watchers have recognized and speculated 
over Roberts’ shift to the left, the reason for 
the shift remains obscure. Beyond 
amorphous notions of Roberts’ special 
concerns for his “legacy” or the court’s 
“legitimacy,” what accounts for Roberts’ 
recent move to moderation? Only he truly 
knows the answer, but one possibility is that 
Roberts has learned something from his time 
on the bench. In particular, his transformation 
might have been influenced by two specific 
cases: one high-profile, the other largely 
forgotten.  
 
Few Supreme Court decisions have sparked 
more controversy and subjected the court to 
more widespread criticism than its 2010 
ruling in the campaign finance reform case 
Citizens United. The court’s 5–4 decision, 
with Roberts in the majority, held that 
corporations and unions have a First 
Amendment right to spend unlimited 
amounts of money to influence elections. The 
decision put the court at the very epicenter of 
political debate—precisely the place Roberts 
said he wanted to avoid during his 
confirmation hearings. The ruling, which 
many believe benefits the GOP, has been 
seen as partisan; almost no one sees Citizens 
United as simply a matter of balls and strikes. 
It was also anything but the kind of small, 
incremental steps Roberts claimed to prefer 
when altering existing doctrine. 
 
Some conservatives ask if Roberts is “going 
wobbly.”  
 
If one wanted an explanation for why Roberts 
changed his vote in the first Affordable Care 
Act case in 2012, Citizens United would be a 
good place to start. According to Jeffrey 
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Toobin, Citizens United was “orchestrated” 
by Roberts. Yet the opposite is likely true. 
Roberts preferred a narrow ruling in Citizens 
United but was persuaded by his conservative 
colleagues to join a very broad, precedent-
reversing decision that radically shifted the 
terrain of campaign finance law. The country, 
across political lines, was angry. And two 
years later the Affordable Care Act case 
looked like a repeat performance: The chief 
justice sought a narrow ruling voiding the 
individual mandate while his conservative 
colleagues pushed for a more aggressive 
ruling that would overturn the whole law, 
including the hundreds of provisions on 
issues that didn’t relate in any way to the 
constitutionality of the mandate. As reporting 
at the time revealed, on the eve of a 
presidential election that promised to make 
the court’s decision the biggest issue in the 
campaign, Roberts seemingly balked. He 
wasn’t following his friends down the rabbit 
hole again. 
 
Roberts may also have learned a similar, 
valuable lesson from a far less familiar 
ruling: House v. Bell, from Roberts’ very first 
term on the court. Few remember the facts of 
this case—Paul House, a man sentenced to 
death, won the right to file a habeas petition 
in federal court—but you can bet Roberts will 
never forget it. Joined by Scalia and Thomas, 
Roberts wrote a partial dissent that 
contemptuously dismissed House’s claims of 
innocence.* To House’s contention that his 
scratches and bruises were from his 
construction work and a cat’s claws, Roberts 
derisively replied, “Scratches from a cat, 
indeed.” Several years later, however, 
prosecutors dropped all charges against 
House, who was exonerated by DNA 
evidence. 
 
House is the type of case that should cause 
any justice to second-guess his or her own 
intuitions and judgments. Certainly it offered 
Roberts an object lesson in the perils of 
judicial overconfidence: Don’t be so certain 
you are right even when you are certain you 
are right. On some issues, like voting rights, 
Roberts’ views may be so longstanding and 
firmly held as to be immune to moderation. 
And some of his seemingly liberal votes may 
be strategic, part of what legal scholar and 
Slate contributor Richard Hasen calls 
Roberts’ “long game.” Yet somehow the 
spirit of compromise, if not the ghost of Paul 
House, haunts the chief justice’s chambers.  
 
No one doubts that Roberts leans right 
jurisprudentially. Yet over the past two 
terms, we’ve seen evidence that Roberts has 
become a bit more circumspect of his own 
jurisprudential views and perhaps more wary 
of those of his conservative colleagues. 
Carrie Severino of the right-leaning Judicial 
Crisis Network says, “There certainly seems 
like a more consistent pattern on the part of 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito of being really 
conservative to the core.” In this way, we 
might see the conservative wing of the court 
in a similar light as the intramural wars 
plaguing the Republican party in general: 
Mainstream conservatives find themselves 
trying to fight off the more radical, burn-
down-the-house Tea Partiers. Some on the 
court seem less interested in incremental 
steps than infernos. 
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Of course, there are two major decisions yet 
to come this term that will color any analysis 
of Roberts for years, if not decades, to come: 
King v. Burwell, on the availability of 
subsidies on the federally created health care 
exchanges, and Obergefell v. Hodges, on the 
right of same-sex couples to marry. No one 
outside the court knows how those cases will 
come out, but don’t be surprised if once again 
Roberts defects from the 
Scalia/Thomas/Alito wing. By now he’s 
learned to watch out for where his friends 




“A Liberal But Restrained Supreme Court Term” 
 
Wall Street Journal 
Jess Bravin 
June 30, 2015 
 
The Supreme Court in the just-completed 
term passed up a number of opportunities to 
upend existing law, including the Affordable 
Care Act. 
 
In areas including civil rights, employment 
discrimination and voting-rights laws, the 
justices rejected conservative-backed legal 
efforts to push the court’s precedents to the 
right. In cases that divided the court, it at 
times reached liberal conclusions as one or 
more conservatives—typically swing Justice 
Anthony Kennedy—sided with the court’s 
four liberal justices. The term’s record shows 
that the liberal justices stuck together with a 
consistency the court’s conservatives didn’t 
match, including in last week’s landmark 
rulings on same-sex marriage and health care. 
 
The term’s dynamic showed a reluctance of 
the John Roberts court, where Republican 
appointees hold the majority, to upend the 
status quo. That reticence stands in contrast 
to rulings in recent years, when issues such as 
campaign finance brought conservatives 
together to overturn precedent. 
 
“The chief justice really does take restraint 
seriously,” said University of Michigan 
political scientist Andrew Martin, who helps 
run the Supreme Court Database that 
provides quantitative analysis of the justices 
and their decisions. “At times, that is going to 
put a justice in contraposition to what his 
ideological preferences might be.” 
 
“Lawyers overwhelmingly are raised in an 
environment where stability is valued, 
change is complicated,” said Stanford law 
professor Mark Kelman. Switching direction 
is “always more complex than whether you 
would have enacted it in the first place.” 
 
The court’s hesitation to strike down existing 
laws was evident in several cases. 
 
It left in place a legal tool for enforcing the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968 that allows housing 
lawsuits without proof of intentional 
discrimination against minorities, in a 5-4 
ruling in which maverick conservative 
Justice Kennedy joined liberal Justices Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. 
 
Conservatives and businesses for years have 
been trying to rein in housing lawsuits that 
use the legal doctrine, known as disparate 
impact. 
 
Twice since 2011 the court had agreed to 
consider whether such cases could proceed, 
only to see them vanish when the parties 
settled or dropped appeals. This year, the 
justices finally had their chance, in a Texas 
case—and it voted to leave disparate impact 
intact. 
 
“Residents and policy makers have come to 
rely on the availability of disparate-impact 
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claims,” Justice Kennedy wrote in the 
majority opinion. 
 
In two voting-rights cases, majorities formed 
by the liberal wing and Justice Kennedy left 
in place mechanisms that aim to make 
political voting districts less partisan and 
fairer for minorities. 
 
In a case from Arizona, the court said states 
could establish independent panels to draw 
electoral maps. In an Alabama case, it held 
that the Voting Rights Act allows challenges 
to political maps that allegedly dilute 
minority political strength by concentrating 
such voters in a handful of districts. 
 
Justice Kennedy’s votes with the court’s 
liberals are a major factor in their success. 
But another conservative justice, Chief 
Justice Roberts, wrote the majority opinion 
rejecting a conservative-backed lawsuit that 
would have gutted the Affordable Care Act. 
He was joined by the liberal bloc and Justice 
Kennedy. 
 
Beneath such broad trends, the term did 
reveal areas of consensus among the justices. 
 
For one, the court showed a concern for 
individual religious expression that crossed 
ideological lines. It ruled unanimously, or 
nearly so, for Muslims who complained 
about religious discrimination, one an inmate 
who prison authorities forbid from growing a 
short beard, another an Abercrombie & Fitch 
Co. job applicant who was rejected for 
wearing a head scarf. 
 
The court also appeared to share a growing 
bipartisan concern over harsh criminal laws, 
siding in several cases with criminal 
defendants who argued that prosecutors had 
overreached. 
A Supreme Court decision makes gay 
marriage legal in all 50 states. What 
constitutional principles did the court’s 
majority apply, and what are the 
implications? WSJ’s Jason Bellini has 
#TheShortAnswer. 
 
On Friday, for instance, an 8-1 court found 
that a federal “three-strikes” law was written 
too vaguely to be constitutional, giving 
prosecutors too much discretion to lengthen 
sentences by invoking prior convictions for 
undefined violent crimes. 
 
A surprise winner this term was the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, an 
agency whose legal positions historically 
have received little deference from the 
Supreme Court. The commission prevailed in 
all three cases it was involved in, ranging 
from the rejected Muslim job applicant to 
pregnancy discrimination to the efforts it 
must make to informally resolve disputes 
before suing an employer. 
 
Those cases, too, can be considered status-
quo rulings, said University of Colorado law 
professor Melissa Hart. The two cases 
involved “employers taking very aggressive 
positions about the limits of EEOC authority 
and the reach of federal employment 
discrimination law,” she said. The decisions 
are “less about any change in the court’s 
attitude toward the EEOC and more about the 
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kinds of arguments being made in lower 
courts.” 
 
There is no guarantee the current dynamic 
will persist into the court’s next term, which 
begins in October. The justices have agreed 
to hear several cases in which right-leaning 
activists seek to overrule or limit precedents 
that protect affirmative action, the one-
person-one-vote rule, and public-employee 
collective bargaining rights. 
 
By placing such cases on the docket—a move 
that takes four anonymous votes—the court’s 
conservatives are signaling their openness to 




“The Polarized Court” 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
May 10, 2014 
 
When the Supreme Court issued its latest 
campaign finance decision last month, the 
justices lined up in a familiar way. The five 
appointed by Republican presidents voted for 
the Republican National Committee, which 
was a plaintiff. The four appointed by 
Democrats dissented. 
 
That 5-to-4 split along partisan lines was by 
contemporary standards unremarkable. But 
by historical standards it was extraordinary. 
For the first time, the Supreme Court is 
closely divided along party lines. 
 
The partisan polarization on the court reflects 
similarly deep divisions in Congress, the 
electorate and the elite circles in which the 
justices move. 
 
The deep and often angry divisions among 
the justices are but a distilled version of the 
way American intellectuals — at think tanks 
and universities, in opinion journals and 
among the theorists and practitioners of law 
and politics — have separated into two 
groups with vanishingly little overlap or 
interaction. It is a recipe for dysfunction. 
 
The perception that partisan politics has 
infected the court’s work may do lasting 
damage to its prestige and authority and to 
Americans’ faith in the rule of law. 
 
“An undesirable consequence of the court’s 
partisan divide,” said Justin Driver, a law 
professor at the University of Texas, “is that 
it becomes increasingly difficult to contend 
with a straight face that constitutional law is 
not simply politics by other means, and that 
justices are not merely politicians clad in fine 
robes. If that perception becomes pervasive 
among today’s law students, who will 
become tomorrow’s judges, after all, it could 
assume a self-reinforcing quality.” 
 
Presidents used to make nominations based 
on legal ability, to cater to religious or ethnic 
groups, to repay political favors or to reward 
friends. Even when ideology was their main 
concern, they often bet wrong. 
 
Three changes have created a courthouse 
made up of red and blue chambers. Presidents 
care more about ideology than they once did. 
They have become better at finding nominees 
who reliably vote according to that ideology. 
And party affiliation is increasingly the best 
way to predict the views of everyone from 
justices to bank tellers. 
 
It tells you more than gender, age, race or 
class, a 2012 Pew Research Center study 
found. And the gap between the parties is 
now larger than at any time in the survey’s 
25-year history. 
 
“Polarization is higher than at any time I’ve 
ever seen as a citizen or studied as a student 
of politics,” said Kay L. Schlozman, a 
political scientist at Boston College. 
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Supreme Court nominations were never 
immune from political considerations. But 
many factors used to play a role. 
 
That is why Republican presidents routinely 
appointed justices who were or would turn 
out to be liberals. Among them were Chief 
Justice Earl Warren and Justices William J. 
Brennan Jr. and Harry A. Blackmun. 
 
But it has been almost 25 years since the last 
such appointment, of Justice David H. Souter 
in 1990. And it has been more than 50 years 
since a Democratic president last appointed a 
justice who often voted with the court’s 
conservatives: Justice Byron R. White, who 
was nominated by President John F. Kennedy 
in 1962. 
 
That timeline may suggest more ideological 
rigidity among Democratic presidents. But 
the number of opportunities played a role, 
too, as there have been twice as many 
Republican appointments since 1953. And 
Republican justices were until recently more 
apt than Democratic ones to drift away from 
the positions of the presidents who appointed 
them. 
 
The new era arrived with the last retirement, 
in 2010. Justice John Paul Stevens, a liberal 
appointed by President Gerald R. Ford, a 
Republican, left the court. Justice Elena 
Kagan, a liberal appointed by President 
Obama, arrived. 
Now, just as there is no Democratic senator 
who is more conservative than the most 
liberal Republican, there is no Democratic 
appointee on the Supreme Court who is more 
conservative than any Republican appointee. 
“It’s not coincidence,” said Lawrence Baum, 
a political scientist at Ohio State, “that the 
court is now divided along partisan lines in a 
way that hasn’t been true.” 
 
The partisan split is likely to deepen, said 
Neal Devins, a law professor at William & 
Mary and an author, along with Professor 
Baum, of a study examining, as its subtitle 
put it, “how party polarization turned the 
Supreme Court into a partisan court.” 
 
Consider, Professor Devins said, the eventual 
retirement of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, a 
Republican appointee who sits at the court’s 
ideological center and joins the court’s four-
member liberal wing about a third of the time 
when it divides along partisan lines. 
 
“When Kennedy leaves,” Professor Devins 
said, “it’s going to move the court a whole, 
whole lot to the left, if the president is a 
Democrat, or slightly to the right, if it’s a 
Republican.” 
 
THESE days, candidates for the court are 
groomed for decades and subjected to intense 
vetting. They are often affiliated with the 
networks of conservative or liberal lawyers 
that have replaced more neutral groups like 
bar associations. And they are drawn more 
than ever from federal appeals courts, where 
their views can be closely scrutinized. 
 
Confirmation battles have grown more 
partisan. With the exception of Justice 
Clarence Thomas, the five most senior 
members of the current court were confirmed 
easily, receiving an average of three negative 
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votes. The four more recent nominees 
received an average of 33. 
 
Once on the court, the justices surround 
themselves with like-minded law clerks, 
consume news reports that reinforce their 
views and appear before sympathetic 
audiences. 
 
In their public statements, the justices reject 
the idea that their work is influenced by 
politics. They point out that their decisions 
were unanimous almost half the time in the 
term that ended in June 2013, and that the 
roughly 30 percent of 5-to-4 decisions did not 
all feature the classic alignments of Justice 
Kennedy joining either the court’s 
conservative wing or its liberal one. 
 
But that was how most of the closely divided 
decisions came out. The conservatives won 
10 times, including a decision striking down 
a core provision of the Voting Rights Act. 
The liberals won six times, including a ruling 
requiring the federal government to provide 
benefits to married same-sex couples. 
 
There are notable exceptions, of course, 
starting with Chief Justice John G. Roberts 
Jr.'s 2012 vote to uphold the heart of the 
Affordable Care Act. 
But standard political-science measurements 
of ideology, based on many thousands of 
votes, confirm the rise of a court divided on 
partisan lines. 
 
The very question of partisan voting hardly 
arose until 1937, as dissents on the Supreme 
Court were infrequent. When the justices did 
divide, it was seldom along party lines. 
 
There is room for interpretation in such 
assessments. But of the 71 cases from 1790 
to 1937 deemed important by a standard 
reference work and in which there were at 
least two dissenting votes, only one broke by 
party affiliation. “The dividing line in the 
court was not a party line,” Zechariah Chafee, 
a law professor at Harvard, wrote in a classic 
1941 book. 
 
Nonpartisan voting patterns held true until 
2010, with a brief exception in the early 
1940s, when a lone Republican appointee 
voted to the right of eight Democratic 
appointees. But the general trend was the 
same. Of the 311 cases listed as important 
from 1937 to 2010 with at least two dissents, 
only one of them, in 1985, even arguably 
broke along party lines. 
 
That adds up to two cases in more than two 
centuries. By contrast, in just the last three 
terms, there were five major decisions that 
were closely divided along partisan lines: the 
ones on the Voting Rights Act, campaign 
finance, arbitration, immigration and strip-
searches. In the current term, last month’s 
campaign finance ruling and Monday’s 
decision on legislative prayer fit the pattern, 
too. 
 
MANY factors seem to contribute to partisan 
polarization on the court, including the 
people who work most closely with the 
justices. 
 
Every year, the justices each hire four recent 
law students, mostly from a handful of elite 
law schools. They consider grades, 
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recommendations and, in recent years, a 
political marker. 
 
In the last nine terms, the court’s current 
Republican appointees hired clerks who had 
first served for appeals court judges 
appointed by Republicans at least 83 percent 
of the time. Justice Thomas hired one clerk 
from a Democratic judge’s chambers, Justice 
Scalia none. 
 
The numbers on the other side are almost as 
striking. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia 
Sotomayor and Kagan hired from 
Democratic chambers more than two-thirds 
of the time. Justice Stephen G. Breyer is the 
exception: His hiring has long been about 
evenly divided. 
 
When law clerks move on, their career paths 
seem subject to the gravitational pull of 
ideology. Clerks for justices appointed by 
Democrats work for Democratic 
administrations, law firm practices headed by 
former Democratic officials and law schools 
dominated by liberals. Clerks for Republican 
appointees often go in the opposite 
directions. 
 
All of this is new, according to a detailed 
study in the Vanderbilt Law Review. “The 
Supreme Court clerkship appeared to be a 
nonpartisan institution from the 1940s into 
the 1980s,” it said. 
 
Like the rest of the country, the justices 
increasingly rely on sources of information 
that reinforce their views. 
 
“We just get The Wall Street Journal and The 
Washington Times,” Justice Scalia told New 
York magazine in September. He canceled 
his subscription to The Washington Post, he 
said, because it was “slanted and often nasty” 
and “shrilly liberal.” He said he did not read 
The New York Times either. 
 
“I get most of my news, probably, driving 
back and forth to work, on the radio,” he said. 
“Talk guys, usually.” 
 
Before the political and social culture of 
Washington grew polarized, most of the 
justices moved in a mixed and often liberal 
milieu. “The social atmosphere in 
Washington had a role in the leftward 
movement of some of the justices,” Professor 
Baum said. 
 
Those days are over, Justice Scalia said. 
“When I was first in Washington, and even in 
my early years on this court, I used to go to a 
lot of dinner parties at which there were 
people from both sides,” he said. “Katharine 
Graham used to have dinner parties that 
really were quite representative of 
Washington. It doesn’t happen anymore.” 
 
In a recent 10-year period, the justices made 
around 1,000 public appearances for which 
their expenses were reimbursed, which 
generally means they were outside 
Washington. They almost certainly made at 
least as many local appearances. But their 
audiences varied. Justices Scalia, Thomas 
and Samuel A. Alito Jr. have addressed the 
Federalist Society, a conservative group, 
while Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer 
spoke to the American Constitution Society, 
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a liberal group. Justice Sotomayor is a 
featured speaker at its national convention 
next month. 
 
Justice Kagan, appearing before the 
Federalist Society in 2005 when she was dean 
of the Harvard Law School, said she admired 




The New York Times 
Linda Greenhouse 
May 28, 2014 
Almost any commentary on the Supreme 
Court these days will include an observation 
about how polarized the court is: how for the 
first time in history, all the Republican-
appointed justices (there are five) are to the 
right of all the Democratic appointees, and 
how the two groups diverge (Justice Anthony 
M. Kennedy occasionally excepted) in many 
of the court’s most ideologically charged 
cases. 
 
True enough. The usual implication is that 
this is a problem for the Roberts court. A 
recent article by a law professor and a 
political scientist, Neal Devins and Lawrence 
Baum, predicts that political polarization on 
the court is here to stay, and they offer a 
compelling exploration of its origins and 
current context. Justice Stephen G. Breyer 
worried aloud in remarks at the annual 
meeting of the American Law Institute in 
Washington last week that members of the 
court were being viewed as “junior varsity 
politicians.” 
 
Justice Breyer’s concern is well founded. But 
the problem goes deeper than the court’s 
rapidly escalating reputation for partisanship. 
In fact, the current emphasis on voting 
patterns obscures rather than illuminates the 
real problem with the Roberts court: what the 
court is actually doing. I mean what it’s doing 
substantively: which cases it chooses to 
decide, and the decisions it reaches. 
 
It’s tempting for commentators, including 
journalists and some scholars, to stay on the 
safe side by talking about process rather than 
substance. Voting patterns can be displayed 
on a chart, and no one can question the 
author’s accuracy or motives. On the other 
hand, to argue that the Roberts court is 
hurtling down the wrong path substantively is 
to make a judgment call that invites pushback 
and debate. I understand that. This is an 
opinion column, and here is my opinion: the 
court’s majority is driving it into dangerous 
territory. The problem is not only that the 
court is too often divided but that it’s too 
often simply wrong: wrong in the battles it 
picks, wrong in setting an agenda that mimics 
a Republican Party platform, wrong in 
refusing to give the political system breathing 
room to make fundamental choices of self-
governance. 
 
I don’t relish connecting these dots; I have 
sometimes felt like the last person standing 
who still insisted, even after living through 
Bush v. Gore, that law and not politics is what 
drives the Supreme Court. In the newsroom 
of The Times, I lobbied periodically against 
the routine journalistic practice of identifying 
judges by the president who appointed them. 
 
But I’m finding it impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that the Republican-appointed 
majority is committed to harnessing the 
Supreme Court to an ideological agenda. The 
evidence is everywhere: from the way the 
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court invited and then accepted a 
fundamental challenge to public employee 
labor unions in Harris v. Quinn, a case argued 
in January and due for decision any day; to its 
brick-by-brick deregulation of campaign 
finance; to its obsession with race and with 
drawing the final curtain on the civil rights 
revolution. 
 
I wrote “ideological” rather than “partisan” 
agenda because there’s something deeper 
going on than mere partisanship. Congress, 
after all, reauthorized the Voting Rights Act 
in 2006 by overwhelming bipartisan 
majorities in both houses, in a bill signed into 
law by President George W. Bush. The Bush 
administration urged the court to uphold the 
law in one of the last briefs filed before the 
president left office. It was a small cadre of 
right-wing activists that pressed the opposing 
view on the court. Success took a while: The 
court lost its nerve on that initial round in 
2009, but conspicuously kept the door open 
for a renewed challenge. The result was last 
term’s Shelby County v. Holder, the 5-to-4 
decision that cut the heart out of the Voting 
Rights Act – which had been the plan all 
along. 
 
Then there is campaign finance, which didn’t 
use to be a specifically partisan issue. Senator 
John McCain of the 2002 McCain-Feingold 
law, Congress’s most recent attempt to curb 
the flow of money into politics, is, after all, a 
prominent Republican. The court upheld the 
law in 2003 with three Republican-appointed 
justices, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day 
O’Connor and David H. Souter, joining the 
5-to-4 majority. 
 
The public was not exactly clamoring to do 
away with campaign finance regulation, but 
the Roberts court set about that project almost 
as soon as Justice O’Connor’s retirement in 
early 2006, and her replacement by Samuel 
A. Alito Jr. cleared the way. The majority’s 
most recent achievement was last month’s 
McCutcheon decision, abolishing aggregate 
limits for direct contributions to candidates in 
federal elections. In the 5-to-4 decision this 
time, there was no party crossover. 
 
Nor was there any crossover in the Town of 
Greece decision earlier this month, 
authorizing sectarian invocations at local 
government meetings. Opening the doors to 
greater public expression and observance of 
religion is another central part of the Roberts 
court’s project. Here, the court has moved a 
bit more slowly. Three years ago, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
invalidated the practice of public prayer at 
county board meetings in Forsyth County, 
N.C. Local clergy members were offering 
prayers that just happened to be laden with 
Christian references. The Supreme Court 
declined to hear the county’s appeal. 
 
But the pause was just temporary. The Town 
of Greece case didn’t differ from the North 
Carolina case in any meaningful way. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit had found the steady diet of 
Christian prayer at town board meetings to be 
an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 
This time, the justices agreed to hear the 
appeal. Since it was obvious that the 
majority’s goal was to overturn the Second 
Circuit’s decision, it was no great surprise 
that the 5-to-4 opinion did so. 
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But Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the court 
was startling nonetheless for its obliviousness 
to the impact that sectarian prayers can have 
on those citizens for whom prayer before a 
government meeting is not “a benign 
acknowledgment of religion’s role in 
society” (to quote the opinion) but an affront. 
“Adults often encounter speech they find 
disagreeable,” Justice Kennedy said 
dismissively. This from a justice who in his 
majority opinion in a Florida death penalty 
case on Tuesday emphasized the right of a 
convicted murderer to be treated with 
“dignity” by having his intellectual deficit 
assessed meaningfully rather than 
mechanically. The Constitution’s “protection 
of dignity reflects the Nation we have been, 
the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire 
to be,” Justice Kennedy wrote on Tuesday, 
overturning a death sentence. I was left to 
wonder about the dignity of the two women 
who sued Greece, N.Y., on the claim that the 
price of conducting their business with the 
town board should not include having to 
listen to Christian prayers. 
 
The country didn’t need to have the religious 
culture wars reignited, but thanks to the court, 
that’s where we now are. Alliance Defending 
Freedom, the Christian-right group that 
represented the victorious town, has taken out 
newspaper ads praising the decision’s “far-
reaching implications” and offering its 
“model prayer policy” that people can press 
on their local governments. The Supreme 
Court’s “O.K. to pray” is being quickly and 
unsubtly turned into a right to pray. The 
Alliance’s reference to a “long-standing, 
important tradition of public prayer” isn’t 
accurate, at least as to its client; the Greece 
town board observed only a moment of silent 
prayer until 1999, when for unexplained 
reasons, the board started inviting local 
ministers to pray out loud. 
 
It’s impossible to talk about the Roberts court 
without coming back to race. The majority 
just can’t leave it alone. Last term, in addition 
to the Voting Rights Act case, the court 
reached out in Fisher v. University of Texas 
to review the affirmative action admissions 
plan at the flagship Austin campus. The 
university’s Regents, who not too many 
decades ago presided over a segregated 
system, have been trying their best to 
navigate the shifting tides of affirmative 
action and find a way to achieve diversity not 
only in the aggregate, but in the university’s 
classrooms and across its fields of study. 
 
The majority’s effort to ride the Fisher case 
into the sunset of affirmative action failed 
because the case was such a manifestly poor 
vehicle. It was moot by any objective 
measure, the recruited plaintiff having 
already graduated from another university 
before the court even accepted the case. And 
the Texas admissions plan is so unusual – 
guaranteeing admission to the top 10 percent 
of every graduating high school class while 
also engaging in some racially conscious 
tailoring for about one seat out of five – that 
any opinion would be likely to have only a 
limited effect elsewhere. So the court was left 
to nibble around the edges, ultimately 
sending the case back to the lower court for 
another look. Its appetite unfulfilled, the 
Supreme Court will be back for more. (The 
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vote in the Fisher case was 7 to 1; it’s easy to 
depolarize when you’re deciding very little.) 
 
Professors Devins and Baum, in their article 
on partisanship at the Supreme Court, argue 
that the current dynamic is a predictable, even 
inevitable reflection of extreme polarization 
in our politics. I don’t think they’re wrong, 
but it occurs to me to wonder if the flow 
might also be running in the other direction. I 
wonder whether the Supreme Court itself has 
become an engine of polarization, keeping 
old culture-war battles alive and forcing to 
the surface old conflicts that people were 
managing to live with. Suppose, in other 
words, that instead of blaming our politics for 
giving us the court we have, we should place 
on the court at least some of the blame for our 
politics. 
